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1 Introduction 
1.1 Resilience research – a view across the sciences 
In Pimm [17] and Holling [12]fundamental concepts ideas and insights regarding resilience of 
ecology systems are introduced. Resilience is introduced as as the ability of systems to sustain 
disturbances, and reduce the time it takes before the systems recover to their original states of 
functionality. Moreover, the magnitude of a disturbance, which is able to bring the system into 
another state of equilibrium with different functionality characteristics, is proposed as a meas-
ure of resilience. It is noted that not only the “strength” characteristics of systems with respect 
to disturbances play a role for resilience, but that “capacity building”  is a key facilitator for 
“preparedness and recovery”. Janssen and Anderies [1] discuss the relationship between sys-
tems robustness and resilience characteristics and underline that these are strongly dependent. 
Derissen et al. [6] conclude that system resilience is not necessarily a preferred state. One sys-
tem may possess several states of equilibrium, which individually could be resilient; however, 
the benefits associated with the different possible resilient states may differ significantly. An-
deries [2] addresses optimal allocation of available resources for the built environment and 
points at strategies for enhancing resilience in dependency of the magnitude and frequency of 
disturbances.  
Abstract: An overview of selected contributions across the different sciences to 
sustainability and resilience research is provided and discussed. A general frame-
work for supporting decisions for sustainable and resilient design and management 
of societal infrastructures is then proposed taking basis in Bayesian decision analysis 
and probabilistic systems performance modelling.   
A principal example for decision support at regulatory level is presented  for a cou-
pled system comprised of infrastructure, social, hazard and environmental subsys-
tems. The infrastructure systems is modelled as multi-component Daniels system 
generating benefits over time after deduction of potential losses due to disturbance 
events.  The societal system is represented in terms of the preparedness level with 
respect to  respond, reorganize and rehabilitate functionality after disturbances and 
the environmental system is represented in terms of local and global scale con-
straints concerning acceptable emissions.  
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Cutter et al. [5] addresses resilience of social systems and provides indicators with explanatory 
power regarding their ability to sustain disturbances and to re-organize, adapt and re-establish 
functionality during and after disturbances.  
In Kates et al. [15] it is recommended to explore and assess the relation between resilience and 
sustainability and decision support systems are proposed as a means to identify sustainable 
paths of societal developments. Building on the ideas and concepts relating to the Planetary 
Boundaries introduced by Steffen et al. [19] and Rockstrom [18], Hauschild [11] suggests to 
utilize quantitative sustainability assessments to assess the aggregate impacts of human activi-
ties at global level with respect to the main parameters controlling safe operating conditions for 
the planetary system, such as climate change and biodiversity. Thereby facilitating comparison 
of best available knowledge regarding the impacts associated with different possible societal 
development trajectories with the corresponding capacities of the planetary system.  
Based on the aforementioned developments, new ideas on resilience modelling and quantifica-
tion for systems relating to infrastructure are proposed in Faber et al. [8]. There a novel decision 
analytical approach to resilience modelling is taken and a probabilistic framework for the rep-
resentation and quantification of resilience of interconnected systems is proposed. Resilience 
failure is represented as the event that a disturbance leads to a capacity loss of the system be-
yond its accumulated reserves and the probability and consequences associated with the event 
are modelled and analysed using approaches and techniques from modern structural reliability 
theory.  Faber and Qin [10] extend the ideas of Faber et al. [8] to address also aspects of sus-
tainability by considering material consumption and related CO2 emissions associated with 
construction, operation and failure of infrastructure systems providing first insights on how 
resilience, efficiency and sustainability relate to each other – and on how resilient is resilient 
enough.  
In the present paper, following closely Faber et al. [8] and Faber and Qin [10], we outline and 
extend our previous works in order to investigate how to improve strategies for achieving resil-
ient infrastructure systems in the face of both operational disturbances and disturbances origi-
nating from accidents, natural hazards or terrorist attacks by means of dedicated design 
provisions.   
2 Decision analysis framework 
2.1 Decision analytical systems representation 
The considered system as illustrated in Figure 1 is comprised by the infrastructure system, the 
governance system, the geo-hazards system, the ecological/life support system and the regula-
tory system. As illustrated in Figure 1, it is assumed that the performances of the interlinked 
system evolve over time and the ultimate objective is to identify decisions on the design and 
governance of the interlinked system, which optimizes these performances in accordance with 
societal preferences. Typically, performances such as reliability, risk, efficiency, robustness, 
resilience and sustainability are of core interest. It is important to note that this system repre-
sentation facilitates accounting for the temporal dependency in system performances over time 
– which is of special interest in resilience and sustainability modelling. In the example consid-
ered in Chapter 3 the temporal evolution of the system performances is accounted for through 
time-slicing, whereby the condition of the system is modelled e.g. on an annual basis and the 
condition of the system at one particular time depends on the system performance in the past. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of interlinked system with time slicing over time (extended from Faber et al. [9]) 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of systems modeling framework (Faber et al. [9]) 
The performances of the interlinked system (see Figure 1) may be assessed from the principal 
model illustrated in Figure 2 which applied in accordance with  Bayesian decision analysis 
facilitates consistent book-keeping of benefits and losses associated with different decision al-
ternatives and with due consideration of uncertainties and/or lack of knowledge.  
2.2 Modelling of resilience failure 
Different propositions for the modelling and quantification of systems resilience are available 
in the literature, see e.g. Cimellaro et al. [4]and Linkov et al. [16]. Typically, focus is directed 
on the short-term representation of the ability of the system to sustain and recover from disturb-
ances, fast and without substantial loss of functionality. Hazard and disturbance events are gen-
erally specified in terms of type and intensity. The ability to sustain and recover from 
disturbances is modelled through the social, organisational and adaptive capacities together 
with traditional characteristics of technical systems such as strength, ductility, brittleness, re-
dundancy, segmentation and diversity, see e.g. Derissen et a. [6]and Pimm [17].      
Following Faber [7], we propose a life-cycle oriented model of systems resilience in which 
scenarios of benefit generation and losses are modelled and analysed over time and where in-
sufficient resilience or systems resilience failure is defined as exhaustion of system capacity 
(social, economical and/or environmental). Resilience, in the same manner as robustness is 
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thereby a system characteristic of a random nature and requirements to resilience may only be 
specified meaningfully in probabilistic terms; e.g. in terms of an acceptable annual probability 
of resilience failure.  
In Figure 4 this idea is illustrated for the simple case of a system for which the only explicitly 
considered capacity is a financial reserve collected as a fixed percentage of the annual benefit 
generated by the system over time.  
 
Figure 4 : The proposed resilience model in terms of time histories of benefit generation and corresponding time 
histories of accumulated economic reserves [8]. 
The general shape of the benefit loss curves in the aftermath of disturbances reflects, that a 
certain time is required before the functionality can be re-established; first only up to a certain 
level, reflecting that interim solutions are foreseen, implemented and operated while waiting 
for the preparation and implementation of full and possibly even improved system rehabilita-
tion. In Figure 4 two pairs of time histories of benefit generation and accumulated economic 
reserves are illustrated and it is seen how disturbance events may both reduce the benefit gen-
eration as well as the reserves. In the time history illustrated with a green line it is seen that a 
disturbance event exhausts the accumulated reserves and causes a resilience failure. 
The probability of resilience failure ( , )RFP t a  may in this manner be represented and assessed 
probabilistically as (see Faber and Qin [10]):    
 ( , ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0RF r rP t P r t s t  a X a X a                                                  (1) 
where ( ( ), )rr tX a  is a function representing a given capacity of the system at time t  and  
( ( ), )rs tX a  is a function representing the stress on the system caused by a disturbance event at 
time t . ( )tX is a vector of random variables which may depend on time and a is a vector con-
taining all decision alternatives which may affect the resilience performance of the system. It 
is seen that the problem of assessing the probability of resilience failure is a first excursion 
problem. Conditional resilience may be modelled and assessed utilizing the scenario based life-
cycle oriented approach. Conditioning on hazard events of given characteristics, the resilience 
can be defined as recovery within a given time horizon without exceeding available reserves.  
Examination of Figure 4 reveals that the first immediate drop in the benefit rate (or functional-
ity) after a disturbance event relates directly to the systems robustness. Even with moderate 
assumptions concerning the contribution of indirect consequences to total consequences it is 
apparent that cascading failures and loss of functionality plays a significant role for the resili-
ence of the system. Moreover, it is seen in Figure 4 that a starting capital or reserve is assumed 
available at time 0t  . In a normative perspective, such a reserve is indeed possible, provided 
that the portfolio of assets in the considered system is sufficiently large. In the design and man-
agement of systems, however, sufficient resilience critically depends on the maintenance of this 
reserve as illustrated in the example presented in Chapter 3. 
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2.3 Modelling of sustainability failure 
The framework presented in the foregoing facilitates for a joint consideration of impacts to the 
environment, health and welfare of people, economy and exhaustion of natural resources from 
the perspective of intergenerational and temporal equity. However, in the following, only im-
pacts of CO2 emissions to the stability of the planetary system are considered – the Earth Life 
Support System (ELSS). According to Steffen et al. [19] the ELSS may become unstable if its 
capacities to cope with emissions and other disturbances caused or influenced by human activ-
ities are exhausted. Research is still ongoing with respect to understanding and assessing the 
capacities of the ELSS with respect to CO2 emissions, acidification of the oceans, extinction of 
species, fresh water use etc. However, it may be assumed that for each of the presently identified 
11 critical boundary variables it is (or will soon be) possible to formulate criteria of the form: 
( , , ) ( , , ) 0,        1, 2, ..i i Br t s t i n  x a x a        (2) 
where ( , , )ir tx a  and ( , , )is tx a  are complex functions describing the capacities and the stresses 
acting on the ELSS with respect to its Bn boundary variables at a given point in time t . x  is a 
vector of variables entering the functions and a is a vector of decision alternatives which may 
influence both the capacities and the stresses. Assuming that the variables x  are associated with 
uncertainty we may assess system sustainability probabilistically along the same lines as system 
resilience failure through: 
 , ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) 0 ,        1, 2, ..SF i i i BP t P r t s t i n   a x a x a      (3) 
The probability of sustainability failure , ( , )SF iP ta  may, as for the case of resilience failure, be 
assessed as a first excursion problem. In the general case where all Bn  planetary boundary var-
iables are considered, this becomes a vector valued first excursion problem. As stated earlier, 
however in the present paper only CO2 emission environmental impacts are considered. These 
impacts are assumed to be directly related to the material consumption implied by the construc-
tion and operation of the societal infrastructure, with due account to maintenance and recon-
struction after disturbance events as well as renewals due to obsolesce.    
3 Example 
3.1 Infrastructure system representation 
In the present example, we address how accounting for differentiated perspective to the relia-
bility of systems constituents into the design of systems may enhance their performance in 
terms of resilience with respect to different hazard types. The example extends on examples 
given in Faber et al. [8] and Faber and Qin [10] outlined in the following. 
The infrastructure system considered is represented by a Daniels system comprised of Cn  con-
stituents, see Figure 5. The system performances are modelled over time histories of 100 years. 
Each constituent is represented by a resistance R with respect to operational annual maximum 
loading L, and a resistance η  with respect to geo-hazard disturbances H. 
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Figure 5 : Illustration of the nc-constituent Daniels system 
The resistances of the infrastructure system R and η, are assumed correlated with correlation 
coefficient  , 0.8R   , and are both represented by log-normal distributed random variables 
with expected values equal to 1 and coefficients of variation (CoV) equal to 0.2 and 0.3 respec-
tively. The operational annual maximum loading L is modeled by a Gumbel distributed random 
variable with expected value equal to 1 and CoV equal to 0.3. The daily maximum operational 
load is modeled by a Weibull distribution (to ensure non-negative realizations) which is fitted 
such that it provides the same annual failure probability as the Gumbel distribution for the an-
nual maximum. The daily maximum operational load is relevant in the case where part of the 
infrastructure system is damaged and the further progression of system damage is assessed sub-
ject to redistribution of operational load, i.e. Cn L . The constituents of the infrastructure system 
are assumed to behave brittle at failure, implying that they lose their load carrying capacity 
completely after their capacity limit is reached. 
The natural hazard disturbance events are assumed to follow a Poisson counting process with 
annual occurrence rate H . The intensity of disturbance events acting on each constituent HI  is 
assumed to follow log-normal distribution, whose expected value  HE I  varies with the annual 
occurrence rate and coefficient of variation  HCOV I  is equal to 0.4. The realizations of the 
intensities are assumed independent from time to time but the disturbances acting on the con-
stituents at a given time are assumed correlated with correlation coefficient I H = 0.8.  
The limit state functions representing failure of the individual constituents with respect to op-
erational annual maximum loads and the disturbances from the geo-hazard system are given as: 
1
2
( )
( )
O
H H
g z r l
g z i
   
x
x                                                                                                   (4)                         
where 1z  and 2z  are design parameters depending on the target probabilities of constituent fail-
ure which should comply with the requirements of the regulatory system. The material con-
sumption CM  is also introduced here, which is considered proportional to the design parameters 
1z  and 2z together with the total number of constituents. Here for simplicity, the initial material 
consumption is represented by 1 Cz n .  
Failure of the Daniels system takes place either due to annual operational maximum loads ex-
ceeding the capacities of the constituents with possible subsequent cascading failure scenarios, 
or by constituent failures due to natural hazard events, which then further due to daily maximum 
operational loads may lead to cascading constituent failure scenarios for the system. The infra-
structure system represented by the Daniels system provides generation of benefit which is as-
sumed constant in time as long as the system is undisturbed. In case of disturbances due to 
operational or geo-hazard disturbance events the generation of benefit is reduced or lost. It is 
further assumed that the replacement costs in a given event scenario of failures FC  are directly 
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proportional to the number of failed constituents in that event scenario fn , i.e. 10 /F f CC n n . 
Correspondingly, the material consumption is 1 fz n . 
The main function of the governance system is here simply to respond to failures of the infra-
structure caused by disturbances. It is assumed, that the governance system can be represented 
by the functionality disturbance and recovery curve illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 :  Illustration of the main function of the governance system with respect to recovery of infrastructure 
functionality under disturbances (Faber et al. [8]) 
Details on the probabilistic modeling of benefit loss and recovery curve shown in Figure 6 are 
given in Faber et al. [8]  
It is assumed that the governance system maintains a reserve capital to be available over the 
life cycle of the infrastructure system for covering the cost of replacement of system constitu-
ents, which may fail over time due to disturbance events.  At time 0t   the starting capital re-
serve SR  is modeled as a percentage  % of the expected value of the accumulated benefits 
over the life cycle  LE B  minus the construction cost of the system, i.e. CC , which is assumed 
to be proportional to the design parameter 2z  here, i.e.     2% % 2.473S L C LR E B C E B z       . 
The regulatory system is formulated here to manage the performance of the infrastructure sys-
tem subject to the operational loads and the geo-hazard system on behalf of the governance 
system through the calibration of the design parameters 1z  and 2z  and the percentage  %.  
3.2 Discussion of results 
The resilience performance and the corresponding environmental impact of infrastructure sys-
tems are investigated as function of the reliability of the system constituents with respect to the 
geo-hazard system and the social preparedness level, taking basis in an example considering a 
nc -constituent Daniels system. 
In the following we model and assess the annual probability of resilience failure for different 
assumptions regarding the parameters defining the considered system. More specifically the 
system is analyzed with the annual occurrence rate H =1x10-1, 1x10-2, 1x10-3 and 1x10-4 (the 
mean of the intensity  HE I  takes the values 0.1, 1, 10 and 100 correspondingly), the design 
parameter 2z  = 2, 3 and 4, low and high levels of social preparedness. The number of the con-
stituents Cn  is 10. The design parameter 1z  is here defined to be 3.5 corresponding to an annual 
probability ,f Op  close to 42 10 . The percentage  % is set to be relatively low 10% so that the 
influence of the geo-hazard subsystem and the social preparedness system may be assessed with 
moderate computational efforts. 
The value of H  then varied to investigate the influence of the design target with respect to the 
natural hazard disturbances on the systems resilience and material consumption. The results are 
shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively. It is seen that for the rare disturbances with high 
t
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intensities the increase of the design parameter 2z  will not necessarily improve the system re-
silience. The increase of 2z  increases the initial construction cost and correspondingly reduce 
the starting reserves. For the system with small percentage  %  and large 2z , the starting re-
serve SR  diminishes and even small disturbance from the operational load or the geo-hazard 
subsystem may result in exhaustion of the reserve. Nevertheless, the high level of preparedness 
maintains the probability of the resilience failure at a relatively low level. 
 
 (1) Low preparedness                                              (2) High preparedness 
Figure 8 :  Probability of resilience failure of the infrastructure system for different values of H  given the de-
sign parameter 2z  and the level of preparedness 
The expected value of total material consumption of the system considering the initial construc-
tion and further reconstruction due to the damage caused by the disturbances is calculated and 
provided in Figure 9. It is seen that compared with systems with low level of preparedness, the 
systems with high levels of preparedness, which keep the probability of resilience failure low, 
does not increase the consumption significantly. Meanwhile, the increase of the design param-
eter i.e. 2z  results in larger initial material consumption but also reduces the probability of re-
newals during the service life. 
 
 (1) Low preparedness                                                   (2) High preparedness 
Figure 9  : Expected value of material consumption of the infrastructure system for different values of H  given 
the design parameter 2z  and the level of preparedness 
4 Conclusions 
The present paper proposes a general framework for supporting decisions on sustainable and 
resilient design and management of societal infrastructures closely following Faber et al. [8] 
and Faber and Qin [10]. An interlinked system comprised by infrastructure, social, hazard and 
environmental subsystems is presented and analyzed. From the analysis, the trade-offs between 
reliability, resilience, sustainability and reliability may be assessed. The example shows that 
for the considered systems, especially those faced with rare natural hazard disturbances with 
high intensities, a high resilience performance necessitates the availability of an adequate fi-
nancial reserve rather than a high target reliability for the constituents of the considered system; 
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moreover these two factors do not significantly influence the material consumption. A high 
target reliability for the individual constituents generally increase the initial material consump-
tion but the subsequent consumption is reduced. On the other side, a high level of preparedness, 
which improves the resilience performance substantially, does not lead to significant addition 
material consumption.  
The modeling and investigations presented provide a holistic and consistent framework for bal-
ancing tradeoffs between system performance characteristics such as robustness, resilience and 
sustainability. Future research is needed to develop the framework further to better capture the 
interdependencies between impacts to human health, economy, social capacity and emissions 
and other damages and impacts to the qualities of the environment.  
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